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Abstract: A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – 
concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge 
exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the 
matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a 
solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or 
agents, as such, appear. We take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned 
status. We argue that subpersonal states play a significant – arguably, primary – role in much 
epistemically relevant cognition and thus constitute a domain in which we might reasonably 
expect to locate the “missing source” of epistemic value, beyond the value attached to mere true 
belief. 
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I. Epistemic Value and the Swamping Problem 
The past decade or so has witnessed a ‘value turn’ in mainstream epistemology (Riggs 2008). Of 
particular interest have been matters connected to epistemic value, value arising from the 
existence of distinctively intellectual goods, in contrast to, for example, moral or aesthetic goods 
(Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2007, 2011; Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard 2009; Baehr 2009). The 
investigation of epistemic value has generated various puzzles, one of which owes its existence 
partly to a compelling piece of received wisdom: that the epistemic value of knowledge outstrips 
that of mere true belief;1 it may, for instance, be epistemically valuable to believe some true 
proposition <p> via a fortunate guess, but it is even more epistemically valuable to know that 
<p>. A subject who, for example, works stepwise through a proof of logical theorem T1L and, as 
a result, correctly affirms T1L’s status is in a better epistemic state than the person who 
unthinkingly spits out ‘yes, it’s a theorem’ as a mere guess or only because, say, that person likes 
the font in which T1L is set. And this is the case, to reiterate, even though both subjects end up 
with a true belief about T1L’s status as a theorem. 
This apparent truism makes mischief in the following way. Consider what would seem to be an 
equally plausible principle: whatever we say about the value of knowledge must be consistent 
with what we say about the nature of knowledge (Kvanvig 2003). If we accept that the epistemic 
value of knowledge exceeds that of mere true belief, we should not endorse an analysis of 
knowledge foreclosing that very possibility; rather, our analysis of knowledge must comport 
with an account of its constituents (e.g., justification or warrant) such that, plausibly, being 
 
1 In Plato’s Meno, Socrates asserts (uncharacteristically) that he knows this, if he knows anything 
at all. See Kvanvig (2003, Ch. 1) for discussion. 
justified (or warranted) adds value to what would otherwise be a merely true belief. But, some 
influential accounts of knowledge have struggled to satisfy this conditional constraint. 
Take, for example, a straightforward process-reliability account of knowledge, according to 
which knowledge is type-identical to reliably produced true belief (Goldman 1979; Olsson 
2007). If the process reliabilist maintains that the epistemic value of knowledge exceeds that of 
mere true belief, it is incumbent upon her to demonstrate just how the epistemic value of reliably 
produced true belief could exceed the value of mere (that is, not reliably formed) true belief. 
Here the reliabilist runs into trouble. Consider Zagzebski’s telling comparison (Zagzebski 2003): 
an already good-tasting cup of coffee takes on no additional gustatory value simply in virtue of 
its being the product of a machine that reliably produces good-tasting cups of coffee; likewise, it 
is unclear how a true belief would become additionally epistemically valuable if turns out that 
the belief is not only true, but also the product of a reliable belief-forming process.2 It seems that 
the epistemic value of truth “swamps” the value of reliability (Kvanvig 2003, 47–8). But – and 
here’s the bad news for reliabilism – if the epistemic value of truth swamps the epistemic value 
of reliability, then it is false that the epistemic value of reliably formed true belief exceeds the 
epistemic value of mere (unreliably formed) true belief. Thus, the reliabilist’s account of the 
nature of knowledge appears not to be consistent with the assumption that the epistemic value of 
knowledge exceeds that of mere true opinion. 
And though this swamping problem (Kvanvig 2003, 2010, Zagzebski 2003, Jones 1997, 
Pritchard 2009b, Swinburne 1999, and Sylvan 2017) is often treated as an objection specifically 
to (at least standard forms of) reliabilism, it threatens other analyses of knowledge in like fashion 
 
2 Kvanvig (2003) makes a parallel point in terms of the value of chocolate. 
(Kvanvig 2003, 2010; Pritchard 2009): in the case of any account of knowledge which aims to 
uphold the plausible assumption that the epistemic value of knowledge exceeds that of mere true 
belief, whatever conditions must, according to that account, be satisfied by knowledge must 
themselves be such that their satisfaction adds epistemic value to a true belief. And, virtually all 
otherwise promising theories of knowledge (or warrant, or justification) seem to flounder in the 
face of this challenge.3 
Responses to the swamping problem typically take one of three forms: validationist, fatalist, or 
revisionist (Pritchard 2009a, 19–20). Validationists (e.g., Greco 2010; Goldman & Olsson 2009; 
Olsson 2010; Olsson 2007) argue that, when knowledge is understood properly, the epistemic 
value of knowledge is not swamped by the value of true belief. By contrast, fatalists (e.g., Baehr 
2009; Ridge 2013) argue that we circumvent the swamping problem by rejecting the underlying 
intuition about the value of knowledge. Maybe, as this line of thought goes, knowledge is not as 
valuable as we initially thought it was. Finally, revisionists (e.g. Kvanvig 2003; 2010; Pritchard 
2009; 2010; Riggs 2009) agree with fatalists that knowledge lacks a distinctive epistemic value, 
one not shared by mere true belief, while claiming that it is on closer inspection something else – 
typically understanding – which possesses the distinctive sort of epistemic value mistakenly 
attributed to knowledge. 
II. The Swamping Problem and the Personal/Subpersonal Distinction 
 
3 Pritchard (2010) has suggested that, among existing contenders, robust virtue epistemology 
(e.g. Sosa 2007; Greco 2010) boasts resources most likely to vindicate the value of knowledge in 
the face of the swamping problem. However, at least as Pritchard sees it, robust forms of virtue 
epistemology are materially inadequate. And, perhaps more germane to present purposes, virtue-
theoretic proposals are not sufficiently informative when pitched at the personal level, a concern 
we develop in more detail below. 
II.A  
Despite deep disagreement about how best to solve the swamping problem, all parties seem to 
agree where to look in conceptual space: if there is a solution, it is to be found at the personal 
level. What is the personal level? In broad strokes, it is the realm of states of persons “as such, as 
experiencing, thinking subjects and agents” (Davies 2000a, 88, summarizing Dennett’s original 
thought when introducing the idea of a distinctively personal level of explanation or 
description).4 Although the distinction between the personal and subpersonal levels is frequently 
taken for granted, the details could use some sorting out. Such sorting out is not our project here. 
Thus, in the remainder, we will simply follow precedent and take accessibility to consciousness – 
typically operationalized as reportability – and suitability for appearance in folk psychological 
and rationalizing explanations as the primary marks of personal-level status.5  
The standard formulation of the swamping problem presupposes a contrast between knowing and 
merely truly believing, and both belief and knowledge are widely thought to be states of whole 
persons as such; one’s beliefs (neat and as components of knowledge states) are typically 
available to introspection, and even more straightforwardly, they are clear candidates for 
inclusion in rationalizing and folk psychological explanations of one’s actions. Moreover, these 
personal-level states are thought by many to have a distinctive sort of content; in fact, it is 
 
4 Dennett introduced the distinction (1969, 93) as a difference in styles of explanation (or 
between sets of explanatory vocabularies). In our discussion, we focus on the corresponding 
ontological questions – of personal-level states, properties, or processes – as is frequently done in 
the contemporary literature. 
5 Davies (2000a, 88–90, 2000b, 46) focuses on these characteristics of personal-level states and 
processes, as do Shea (2013, 1064–1065) and Frankish (2009, 90–91); on the messiness of the 
personal-subpersonal distinction, see Drayson (2012, 2014). 
sometimes claimed that the kind of content had distinctively by personal-level states is the only 
genuine form of content and that only this sort of content has such genuine epistemic properties 
as carrying justificatory force (McDowell 1994a, 1994b). Generally, the consensus holds that 
personal-level states – beliefs, memories, perceptions – and justification-relevant relations 
between them provide the subject matter of epistemology and thus that, if a solution is to be 
found to the swamping problem, it will be found there – in the nature of personal-level states and 
relations between them or between their contents. 
We take exception to this orthodoxy, or at least to its unquestioned status. After all, the further 
cognitive science has progressed, the greater the extent to which its results – some of which we 
will describe in Sections Three and Four – have marginalized the personal level in its accounts of 
human behavior (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wegner 2002; Wilson 2002; Lau et al. 2007; 
Haybron 2007; Schwitzgebel 2008; Alfano 2013; Harman 2000; Doris 2002; Gendler 2008). 
Given the state of the empirical evidence, then, it makes good sense for epistemologists to look 
to the subpersonal level. We contend that such exploration holds promise, that subpersonal states 
and their content6 play a significant role in epistemically relevant cognition – particularly in 
cases in which there is no substantive model of what one might think should be the 
corresponding personal-level state or process – and thus constitute a domain in which we might 
 
6 Although we emphasize the role of so-called subpersonal-level states and take the content of 
such states to be relevant to questions about epistemic value, we do not commit ourselves to a 
distinctive form of content at the subpersonal level. It might be that the content of the relevant 
subpersonal states is of the same sort as the content of supposed personal-level states, but that the 
state-types are different (cf. Heck 2000, which makes a parallel point regarding the conceptual-
nonconceptual distinction). That is to say, we might solve the swamping problem by moving the 
discussion to the subpersonal level, though the content found at that level might or might not 
differ in its nature from the kind of content typically supposed to appear at the personal level. 
reasonably expect to locate the (or, at least a) missing source of epistemic value, beyond the 
value attached to mere true belief. 
II.B  
Two preliminary comments about our argumentative strategy are in order. First, we do not press 
the following, relatively trivial point: that all personal-level states or processes are grounded in, 
enabled by, or realized by physical states or processes, or supervene on physical states or 
processes (of the brain, it is typically thought). A broad consensus in philosophy of mind and 
epistemology accepts some form of physicalism – typically cashed out as a claim about 
realization or supervenience – and we do not intend merely to endorse that consensus. We have a 
narrower point in mind. We claim that, in some cases, personal-level states have epistemic value 
the source of which seems mysterious viewed from the standpoint of the personal level. In such 
cases, there is no straightforwardly identifiable personal-level process or set of relations that 
might account for the value of such states. Yet, when one takes the subpersonal perspective, the 
source of epistemic value comes more clearly into view. The matter might be best seen as 
involving a structural mismatch: in the cases at issue, a minimal amount of structure appears at 
the personal level, while a more richly structured process appears at the subpersonal level; as a 
result, the attempt at personal-level analysis falls short for want of explanatory resources, while, 
in contrast, subpersonal-level structure and processes offer plentiful explanatory resources, many 
of them relevant to questions of justification, or so we will argue. 
Second, although our arguments in Section Three and Four presuppose a relatively demanding 
criterion of adequacy for a validationist response, it is not as demanding a criterion as some 
might wish. We tend to agree with Duncan Pritchard (2013, 12) that ‘in general and all other 
things being equal, we desire to be knowers as opposed to being agents who have mostly true 
beliefs but lack knowledge’. Showing that this desire is not misguided does not require showing 
that, in every instance (actual or possible), knowledge that P is more valuable than mere true 
belief that P.  If a successful validationist response were to require meeting the strong (we 
believe, unduly strong) demand that all possible items of knowledge have a value that exceeds 
the value of their corresponding true belief tokens, then the arguments we develop below would 
likely come up short. However—as Kvanvig (2003) himself has argued at length—it’s not at all 
obvious that there is, at the end of the day, any way of defending a validationist response if such 
a strong modal criterion of adequacy is assumed. And, this point gains further traction when 
(following Sosa 2000, see also David 2005 and Lynch 2009) one reflects on the tension between 
the strong modal criterion of adequacy and the apparent ‘pointlessness’ of attaining knowledge 
of trivial truths (e.g., truths about the number of grains of sand on an arbitrary section of a 
beach). The reader should bear in mind, however, that we do not aim to satisfy only the 
exceptionally weak demand that in some actual cases, knowledge that P has more epistemic 
value than the mere true belief that P. Rather, we aim to satisfy an intermediate and practically 
relevant demand: to show that in a wide range of actual cases involving human subjects, 
knowledge that P has more value than the mere true belief that P. 
With these points in mind, here is the plan. Section three relates our shift in perspective – from 
the personal level to the subpersonal level – specifically to extant, proposed personal-level 
solutions to the swamping problem on behalf of the process reliabilist (Olsson 2008) and virtue 
epistemologist (Greco 2019), arguing that such proposals show more promise when recast at 
least partly in subpersonal terms and supplemented accordingly. In Section Four, we move into 
entirely uncharted territory, by proposing and defending two arguments directly in support of a 
subpersonal validationist solution to the swamping problem, a solution we defend as legitimate 
with reference to the weaker criterion of adequacy that Pritchard seems to have in mind and 
which isn’t predicated upon what are perhaps overoptimistic assumptions about what it is that 
should be validated.  
III. Subpersonal Transformations of Personal-Level Proposals 
In this section, we argue, in III.A, that one extant reliabilist attempt to solve the swamping 
problem – viz. Olsson’s (2007) argument from increased practical value – faces what appear, 
from the empirical standpoint, to be insurmountable hurdles. Upon consideration of further 
empirical results, we conclude that Olsson’s central claim – that justification confers value by 
conferring stability – has more plausibility when one focuses on subpersonal processes the 
structural images of which do not appear at the personal level. In Section III.B, we consider what 
is taken to be the most promising personal-level response to the swamping problem currently on 
offer – viz. the solution offered by (robust forms of) virtue epistemology (e.g., Greco 2010) – and 
argue that a subpersonal variation on this approach has more to recommend it. 
III.A 
Erik J. Olsson (2007) argues that “reliabilist knowledge promotes successful action over 
time...[because]...reliabilist knowledge promotes stability and...stability is conducive to 
successful action over time” (ibid., 349). According to Olsson, when an unreliable process 
produces a (mere) true belief that P, the very unreliability of that process will likely undercut or 
neutralize, eventually, that belief’s potential to contribute to successful action. A given subject 
deploys a given mechanism or runs a given process-type (we treat these as equivalent for present 
purposes) repeatedly over the course of her life. In the cases in question, the process-type is, by 
hypothesis, unreliable; thus, the preponderance of later applications of it – that is, those that 
occur after the time at which the application of the process led to the fixation of the subject’s true 
belief that P – will yield false beliefs, which will likely lead to unsuccessful action. As Olsson 
sees things, subjects track the sources of their belief, recording which processes produce which 
beliefs as well as the rate of past success and failure of various processes to produce beliefs that 
lead to effective action. Thus, a subject who continues to use the process in question will 
subsequently doubt or reject P; given feedback from the world, the subject will detect the falsity 
of the outputs of the majority of later applications of the process that produced P, which results 
will call into question P itself (even though P is, in fact, true), thereby robbing the true belief that 
P of what would have been its contributions to successful behavior – presumably because the 
subject abandons, or at least take a highly qualified attitude toward, the belief that P, and thus 
does not act on it.7 
To be clear, to the extent that Olsson’s tack succeeds, it does not provide what many would want 
from a response to the swamping problem: an account of why a justified true belief that qualifies 
as knowledge has more final (i.e., noninstrumental) value than a mere true belief. Rather, it 
 
7 This work builds on the simpler idea (Goldman and Olsson 2009) that having a reliably 
produced true belief is better than having a true belief produced by an unreliable process, 
because one’s having a reliably produced true belief probabilifies one’s having true beliefs in 
similar circumstances in the future. While this may be correct, it does not seem to increase the 
value of any individual belief. A true belief’s having been produced by a reliable process entails 
the presence of a valuable tool in the subject, a tool such that, if the subject continues to possess 
and deploy it, it will produce a preponderance of true beliefs in the future. It is not clear, 
however, why the value of the possession of that tool would increase the value of a given belief 
produced by it, beyond the value the belief has in virtue of its truth. Instead, a belief’s having 
been produced by a reliable process seems to be merely an indicator that the subject possesses a 
tool to produce true beliefs reliably (in certain kinds of circumstances); the relational fact of a 
belief’s having been produced by a reliable process would seem to confer only a diagnostic role 
on that belief. 
focuses on a particular kind of instrumental value, viz. the value that a justified true belief has in 
virtue of its being likely, itself, to continue to contribute to successful action. Nevertheless, the 
account does generally make sense of the intuition that justified true belief is more valuable than 
(mere) true belief, given the incredible importance of successful action in human lives.  
Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that a proposal along the lines of Olsson’s holds promise. 
Whence does it draw its explanatory power, the personal level or the subpersonal level? At what 
level does the connection between justification and value-qua-stability appear? As noted above, 
Olsson supposes that agents generally record which beliefs were produced by which mechanisms 
and keep a running success rate of each mechanism. If the agent were not successfully deploying 
such record-keeping abilities, she would not infer the likely falsity of P from later failures of the 
P-producing process to yield beliefs that support successful action. So far as we can tell, then, 
this is meant to be a proposal about personal-level states. In Olsson’s words, his proposal 
“requires that the agent maintain a mental record, a record in her mind, of how beliefs were 
acquired” (Olsson 2007, 352). 
A fleshed-out version of Olsson’s story would seem to require that, relative to each use of a 
given belief-forming mechanism, the subject accurately encode, not just that the mechanism 
produced the belief in question, but also the context of such production, represented at correct 
level of specificity. Too often, a mechanism that has a weak track record in a context described 
at one level of specificity (use of vision while beneath the surface of the water in a naturally 
formed lake) has a stronger track record relative to a more inclusive set (use of vision 
simpliciter), or vice versa – points familiar from discussions of the Generality Problem for 
process reliabilism.8  
Assume a given true belief P was produced by a mechanism in a context that would be 
appropriately individuated, for the purpose of determining P’s level of justification, at a fine 
grain, and that relative to such a context, the mechanism is in fact unreliable. Let us say, too, that 
the subject mistakenly individuates, in her record-keeping process, the context in question in a 
coarser-grained way relative to which the mechanism in question is, in fact, reliable. In this case, 
the subject will not weed out the unjustified belief that P, because she will treat the contexts of 
the application of the mechanism in question in a coarser-grained fashion and will not come to 
see – on the basis of negative feedback from the world in the relevant finely individuated 
contexts – the mechanism that originally produced the belief that P as unreliable. If this is a 
relatively common phenomenon – if the subject doesn’t identify and record contexts at the 
correct grain – the subject’s various unjustified true beliefs may well persist and continue to 
contribute to successful behavior, contra Olsson’s prediction; the subject will think of P as the 
result of the operation of a reliable mechanism (the visual system applied to the general spatial 
layout, for example), which generally gets things right, instead of seeing the mechanism as being 
applied in more finely individuated context (the visual system as applied in poor light to objects 
at a distance moving quickly), and thus won’t abandon her unjustified belief that P.9 Similarly, 
without accurate records of the sort in question, the subject may well treat a justified true belief 
 
8 For a recent influential discussion of this problem, see Lyons (2018). 
9 This kind of concern is not merely theoretical. For instance, the sort of source information that 
some languages encode syntactically marks sources only at a very coarse grain – distinguishing 
between such categories as having been acquired by testimony or having been observed first-
hand (Tosun et al. 2013). 
as unjustified and abandon it in accordance with Olsson’s schema. Thus, absent a commitment to 
the reasonably accurate tracking and recording of justification-relevant contexts of belief-
formation, one should doubt that Olsson’s schema identifies the distinctive source of value 
attached to justification. 
How plausible is it, then, that human subjects track, at the personal level, the output of belief-
forming mechanisms in contexts? Below we survey the relevant empirical literature, but let us be 
clear, from the outset, about the sort of evidence we should look for on Olsson’s behalf. It should 
show that, at the personal level, (a) subjects track the sources of their beliefs (and the contexts of 
their formation – take this as read in what follows), (b) subjects do so reasonably accurately, (c) 
subjects use that information to calculate reasonably accurate track records of their various 
belief-producing mechanisms, and (d) subjects bring the results of those calculations to bear on 
commitments to past products of their belief-producing mechanisms (for example, to bear on the 
judgment that a past doxastic output of a given mechanism is likely to be true) and adjust 
accordingly. Moreover, given that Olsson’s account of how justification adds value (by creating 
stability) is pitched at the personal level, we should expect subjects to be able to report 
accurately on the states and processes in question in connection with (a)-(d). This sets a very 
high bar, to be sure, and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the empirical literature runs in the opposite 
direction, supporting at least a moderately pessimistic view about every one of these desiderata 
and, more importantly, a firm skepticism concerning their joint satisfaction. The literature in 
question is enormous, but we shall, in what follows, convey a sense of the obstacles faced by 
Olsson’s personal-level account. 
Consider first the so-called illusory-truth effect (Hasher et al. 1977; Dechêne at al. 2010). Mere 
exposure to sentences increases the likelihood that subjects will judge them to be true when 
asked later about them. This occurs even in cases in which subjects know better, that is, even 
when they have stable beliefs that contradict the information to which they’re being exposed 
experimentally (Fazio et al. 2015). The leading explanation of this phenomenon appeals to a 
more general and well-established subpersonal construct, ease of processing, in this case created 
by previous exposure (Begg et al. 1992).10 Further results reinforce this hypothesis: merely 
setting (unfamiliar) sentences in an easier-to-process font increases the probability (over 
sentences set in a more difficult to read font) that subjects will judge them to be true after a 
single previous exposure (Reber and Schwartz 1999). In such cases, subjects simply are not 
attending accurately to the sources of their beliefs or to the mechanisms producing them. If they 
were aware, at the personal level, that a mere ease-of-processing mechanism were producing the 
beliefs in question – responding only to, for instance, previous exposure to written text with no 
attached credibility – subjects would, presumably, not make the judgments they do. 
 
10 Some such patterns of judgment are accompanied by a reported sense of confidence (a “sense 
of knowing”) the strength of which reliably increases with, e.g., the number of past exposures to 
the sentence in question. We should not, however, take such a reportable sense of knowing to 
indicate that the processes producing the judgments concerning truth or validity – processes 
exhibiting ease-of-processing effects, for instance – operate at the personal level. Such a criterion 
would be too weak, for it would miscategorize paradigmatically subpersonal-level processes as 
personal. Consider textbook approaches to speech processing, the best known of which is 
Chomskyan generative grammar. It’s widely accepted that subjects’ conscious sense of what’s 
grammatical and what’s not – their “linguistic intuitions” – provides important data in theory 
construction in this domain. But, the theories so constructed involve processes (computational 
sensitivity to the presence of ‘wh’-traces, that no subject can report, for instance) that are 
subpersonal if any cognitive processes are. Similarly, consider processes operative in face 
recognition. A reportable sense of familiarity with a given face may correspond with the face’s 
having been categorized correctly. But, this personal-level sense of familiarity puts subjects in no 
position to report on the structure of the process that extracts the fine-grained geometrical 
features of faces and that produces successful acts of face-recognition – by, for instance, 
calculating the distance, in a multi-dimensional feature space, of the face currently represented 
from various exemplar faces (that is, standing representations of known individuals’ faces). That 
process is clearly subpersonal. 
The illusory truth results are by no means outliers. Empirical work documents various kinds of 
cases in which subjects fail to track the sources of their beliefs and mechanisms that produced 
them (see Marsh et al. 2008, for a review). In a well-known list-learning paradigm, for example, 
subjects are exposed to a list of semantically interrelated words and asked later about words that 
would have “fit” onto the list (but weren’t on it); subjects frequently judge that these words were 
listed. Subjects seem to have both a false belief and to make a false judgment about the source of 
that belief, thinking they heard or read the word when it was instead self-generated (by a 
subpersonal process of semantic association). And, in some versions of such experiments, the 
personal-level record is strikingly corrupted; subjects report phenomenological experience – a 
rich episodic memory – of, for instance, the experimenter having read the nonlist word aloud, 
even though it is only a lure and was not in fact read aloud (Roediger and Gallo 2005; see Geraci 
and Franklin 2004 for cases in which subjects are misled by nonsemantic linguistic relations). In 
eyewitness suggestibility experiments, subjects report having witnessed what are actually false 
details that experimenters have in one way or another exposed the subjects to after the witnessing 
of the actual event in question; subjects confuse testimony-based belief-formation (verbal or in 
print) for first-person observations made at, for example, the scene of a car accident (Loftus 
1979). A different line of research shows that déjà vu can be induced experimentally, by means 
of mere exposure, which again seems to be a mistake about sources (Brown and Marsh 2010). 
Subjects are susceptible to the false fame effect, incorrectly categorizing faces as being those of 
famous people, as result of mere past exposure to said faces in experimental settings (Jacoby, 
Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko 1989; Jacoby, Woloshyn, and Kelley 1989). And, subjects are 
more likely to choose the wrong subject from a line-up when they’ve seen that person’s face in a 
book of “mug shots” prior to viewing the line-up (Brown et al. 1977). Subjects also make source 
errors when recalling the factors that influenced their decisions, in a way that systematically 
supports decisions made (Mather et al. 2000), attributing, for example, positive features to the 
option they chose, even when those positive features were actually attached to the option not 
taken. In addition, the effects of social contagion powerfully distort memory of sources (Meade 
and Roediger 2002; Barnier et al. 2008). And bear in mind that in every one of these cases – as 
well as in the cases of memory-related results discussed in the remainder of this subsection – the 
measures used involve at least some (and often exclusively) personal-level judgments.  
Results on source credibility should be especially troubling to Olsson. In some cases, subjects’ 
beliefs about the credibility of the source of an individual piece of information significantly 
affect their judgments: when they believe that a piece of information is from a credible source, 
they’re significantly more likely to judge it true. But, even then, they have such poor memory for 
the actual sources of individual memories (Begg et al. 1992, 452) that, statistically speaking, the 
actual credibility of the source is not correlated with the subjects’ pattern of endorsements 
(Henkel and Mattson 2011, 1708). Moreover, subjects continue to categorize as true 
approximately 50% of statements they believe (rightly or wrongly) to be from a noncredible 
source (Begg et al. 1992, 451–453). The picture that emerges is of subjects who are not 
completely insensitive to considerations of credibility, but who have (i) mediocre source 
memory, (ii) often make poor use of credibility information they have, and (iii) who continue to 
make widespread errors concerning other matters to do with sources. Considering the multi-step, 
statistical nature of the procedure Olsson demands, such shortcomings compound. As a result, 
there’s no reason to believe of any particular mechanism in a given subject, that the subject will 
have a sufficiently accurate record of the performance of that mechanism and will take it into 
consideration in the formation of new beliefs or the continued endorsement of belief previously 
produced by that mechanism.  
To be fair, some experimenters have gone to significant lengths to try to warn subjects about 
credibility or to get them to use information about credibility to mitigate the formation of or 
reliance on false memories (Echterhoff et al. 2005; Henkel and Mattson 2011; Chambers and 
Zaragoza 2001; Meade and Roediger 2002; Begg et al. 1992). These efforts are not wholly 
without results, but neither do they instill much confidence in human abilities or tendencies. To 
the extent that such warnings have salutary effects (reducing eyewitness suggestibility effects, 
for example), the effects are weak, depend on the specific choice of wording (the warning should 
be given in the indicative, not the subjunctive), and on the timing of the warning (warnings are 
more effective if they’re provided before the “false testimony” not after). This last point, in 
particular, stands in direct tension with Olsson’s framework. On Olsson’s account, warnings that 
a belief-producing mechanism “lacks credibility” come only after the mechanism’s production of 
the original belief in question; in the case of a merely true belief that P, the belief lacks stability 
because later on it becomes apparent to the subject that the mechanism that produced it is 
producing further beliefs that fail to guide successful action. And, even in the specific cases in 
which the warnings work well, for instance, eliminating the effects of misinformation, this 
amounts only to the subjects’ treatment of planted information in the same way as subjects treat 
new information (that is, stimulus items first introduced at the time of later memory tests or 
retests). But, given how badly subjects perform on newly introduced material – for example, 
given the high rate at which subjects falsely claim that newly introduced items were present in 
the earlier study material – Olsson will find little consolation here. It would be one thing if 
prewarnings could somehow get subjects to track sources reliably enough to engage in the 
personal-level feats of memory required by Olsson’s framework. But it’s another to be told 
merely that prewarnings can prevent subjects from being misled by previous-exposure effects, 
but that subjects in these cases nevertheless do not very reliably judge whether they’ve ever been 
exposed to a given stimulus item (that is, whether the current experience has a source in memory 
at all). Notice, too, that the beneficial effects are relatively short-lived (Chambers and Zaragoza 
2001, 1122), which further undermines Olsson’s picture. For on his framework, the “warning of 
unreliability” is likely to come well after the fact – when, significantly later, the mechanism in 
question produces further beliefs that do not support successful action. Even if the subject is 
given a prewarning that alerts her to the potentially misleading ways of a given source, if, before 
long, she stops paying attention to said warning, the benefits of circumspection will have been 
lost by the time she must, on Olsson’s account, notice that a mechanism that produced the merely 
true belief that P is now producing beliefs that fail to support successful action. 
Perhaps it is unsurprising, on general theoretical grounds, that subjects lack the capacity for 
reportable, detailed memory that Olsson’s framework requires. Marcia K. Johnson and 
collaborators (Johnson et al. 1993) developed the leading theory of the monitoring of sources of 
information and memories. Put simply, Johnson’s source-monitoring framework grounds 
subjects’ ability to identify the source of a given memory in the ability to associate the content of 
the memory itself with various cues and features of the context in which the memory was 
formed. Viewed in that light, the various results reviewed above may seem unsurprising, given 
the general remember-to-know (or, R-to-K) shift (Barber et al. 2008; Dewhurst et al. 2009) 
exhibited by human memory: the general tendency for information about the specific 
circumstances to be lost over time and for the supposed knowledge to be represented context-
free. This distinction parallels (and may be largely coextensive with) the widely made distinction 
between episodic and semantic memory (Tulving 1972) and the tendency of memories for 
general information about the world to shift from episodic form – replete with details concerning 
the context in which the information was acquired – to the semantic form, which encodes the 
information itself stripped of such details. To the extent that recall includes detailed information, 
it is typically reconstructed by a process that allows, relatively easily, for error to creep into the 
representation of those details. 
In sum, the breadth and the depth of subjects’ personal-level mistakes – their failure to mark 
sources at all, their failure to mark sources accurately, their failure to use accurate information 
that they have – puts paid to Olsson’s commitments concerning personal-level record keeping in 
humans. Why do we say ‘personal-level’? The experimental literature reviewed above relies 
primarily on personal-level responses – deliberate responses given in full awareness of explicit 
instructions from experimenters, sometimes instructions that explicitly ask about subjects’ 
conscious experiences. But, for our purposes, it need not be the case that all of the failings 
revealed by this literature count as personal-level failings. We proceed to argue that some 
empirical evidence supports a subpersonal reinterpretation of Olsson’s framework. To the extent, 
however, that the literature surveyed above reveals subpersonal mnemonic failings, this dampens 
the prospects of even a subpersonal reading of Olsson’s framework. Recall, though, that the 
compound thesis of the present subsection is conditional in the relevant respect: Olsson’s 
personal-level story concerning the way in which justification is connected to value-qua-stability 
is implausible; and if any version of that story is plausible, it is a subpersonal one. This thesis is 
consistent with there being no plausible version of Olsson’s story about the way in which 
justification gives rise to value-qua-stability.  
What empirical support might there be for a subpersonal reading of Olsson’s proposal?11 We 
must concede that, given the determination of the personal by the subpersonal, every personal-
level failure is, in some sense, a subpersonal one. Thus, regardless of how we categorize 
subjects’ responses in the various experiments alluded to above – as personally or subpersonally 
governed responses – all of the negative results discussed cut against a subpersonal version of 
Olsson’s story. It’s worth noting, however, some reasons for tempered optimism about a 
subpersonal fleshing-out of Olsson’s approach. Cognitive scientists have documented various 
ways in which the cognitive system tracks temporal patterns and sources, for example, in the 
Iowa Gambling Task (as performed by normal subjects – see Bechara et al. 2005) and in tasks 
that exhibit frequency effects (Jones et al. 2013). Also, the grammatical marking of sources of 
information can affect the accuracy of memory. In some languages, obligatory differences in, for 
 
11 Some readers might wonder whether it’s worth pursuing the matter any further. After all, one 
could cast Olsson’s proposal in more straightforward terms: justification confers stability on a 
belief and stability is valuable – end of story. In contrast, we’re inclined to think that any 
proposed solution to the swamping problem worth its salt must identify, in a relatively 
convincing manner, the knowledge- or justification-based source of epistemic value, in this case, 
the plausible relation by which justification produces value-qua-stability. Olsson would seem to 
agree, and thus he offers his (personal-level) account of the way in which reliabilist knowledge 
promotes stability – the account we criticize in the main text. In what follows, we argue that a 
subpersonal version of Olsson’s line of thought offers at least as much promise as (and probably 
more promise than) his personal-level version of it, and we do so in an attempt to identify a 
plausible connection between justification and value (that is, to identify something specifically to 
do with knowledge that confers value on knowledge states, by creating stability). We do not, 
however, attempt to show that there can be no personal-level account of the connection between 
justification and value-qua-stability other than the one Olsson offers. Perhaps such a further 
personal-level account will be developed, or has been and we have yet to encounter it. We are 
open to that possibility. Bear in mind that there are at least two important questions in play. First, 
we should like to know what value-constituting property a knowledge-state might have. The 
right answer may well be “stability.” Second, one might ask “What does a state’s being 
knowledge have to do with that state’s being valuable-qua-stable?” We take this to be a deep 
question about the epistemic source of the value at issue, its source in the properties the co-
instantiation of which constitutes a state’s being knowledge; we focus on the latter question in 
connection with Olsson’s proposal. 
example, verb inflections mark whether the event being reported was seen by the speaker or, 
instead, learned about by testimony. Such markings enhance subjects’ memories for sentences 
marked as reports of first-hand observations, presumably because subjects treat first-hand 
observation as epistemically superior to testimonial acquisition, and first-hand verb-inflection 
triggers application of this bias (Tosun et al. 2013). Such results suggest that the subject tracks at 
least some of the “sources” of her beliefs subpersonally.12 
Now consider the Iowa Gambling Task in which subjects receive rewards and penalties for 
drawing cards from a variety of decks; some decks have a much more profitable structure than 
others. For instance, in one deck, 10 out of 11 cards pay out $50 per card, while the eleventh 
shows a loss of $250, which equals an expected utility of approximately $23 dollars per draw. In 
another deck, 10 out of 11 cards pay $100 per card, while its eleventh shows a loss of $1250, 
which equals an expected utility of approximately -$23 per draw). Many subjects eventually 
achieve a conscious awareness of the superiority of winning decks over losing decks, but prior to 
that point (if it ever comes), subjects have no such awareness, yet they nevertheless 
systematically modulate their selections in favor of the winning decks, while also showing 
physiological signs of a sensitivity to threat of loss when beginning to reach for losing decks. 
Thus, prior to the point of personal-level awareness, a subpersonal pattern-tracking process runs 
in the absence of any corresponding personal-level process. Moreover, the subpersonal process 
tracks a pattern of financial payout from sources and is thus analogous to a pattern of “epistemic 
 
12 In the experiments of Tosun, subjects receive instructions meant to reduce personal-level 
attention to credibility-related questions: “To make the study phase more similar to a natural 
language situation in which participants would not be attempting to remember the sentences or 
the source of evidence, participants were told that the experiment was about their ability to 
comprehend sentences and their reading times would be measured.” (Tosun et al. 2013, 125). 
payout” from sources, a pattern of the sort that Olsson’s account requires us to track at the 
personal level.13 
We acknowledge the limited scope of the evidence of subpersonal source tracking and 
evaluation. In contrast, the wealth of evidence against a personal-level story of the sort Olsson 
has in mind seems damning. We close this subsection, then, with a conditional conclusion: If 
Olsson’s strategy pays off at all, it will do so as a subpersonal-level account of processes that 
produce instrumental value; justified true beliefs are more valuable than merely true beliefs 
because the operation of certain forms of subpersonal processing increases the likelihood that a 
subject will continue to act on a true belief when it’s produced by a reliable (and thus justified) 
process, as compared to beliefs produced by unreliable processes. 
 
13 Our point is not that two processes, a personal-level process and a subpersonal level one, run 
in parallel and that the subpersonal process is the more metaphysically or explanatorily 
fundamental of the two, providing the genuine explanation of epistemic value, in opposition to a 
personal-level explanation that might also be able to do the job. Rather, there is no personal-level 
process of the sort Olsson describes (that’s what we take the empirical evidence to have shown); 
such a process appears only at the subpersonal level, if it appears at all. Thus, our criticism of 
Olsson’s personal-level proposal in no way rests on any claim about causal-explanatory 
exclusion or the relation between realizers and realized states or between supervening properties 
and their supervenience base. Note that this is an example of structural mismatch. There is no 
appropriate record-keeping structure at the personal level, so nothing about the personal-level 
fact of a (true) belief state’s being justified accounts (in Olsson’s suggested way) for its 
production of value (i.e., of stability). In contrast, that connection does stand a reasonable chance 
of appearing at the subpersonal level (or so we’ve argued). Bear in mind that we seek a kind of 
solution to the swamping problem that turns us away from potential conceptual truths about the 
connection between justification and stability (or any other source of epistemic value). Our 
criterion of adequacy requires that we understand how it is that in many cases involving actual 
humans, justification (or warrant) adds value to merely true belief, but without committing 
ourselves to any necessary truth about such addition.  
III.B 
As a personal-level account of the source of epistemic value, virtue epistemology holds apparent 
promise, for it seems to have the resources to articulate a cogent, personal-level solution to the 
swamping problem.14 According to a virtue-based approach, knowledge is true belief the 
correctness of which is because of, or which manifests intellectual virtue on the part of, the agent 
(Zagzebski 1996; Sosa 2009; Greco 2010; Haddock, Millar, and Pritchard 2010). In this section, 
we argue, however, that a subpersonal variation on the virtue epistemologist’s proposed solution 
to the swamping problem fares better than an exclusively personal-level account. 
For ease of exposition, we focus on John Greco’s (2010) canonical presentation of the virtue-
theoretic response to the swamping problem. According to Greco, knowledge is a cognitive 
success (i.e., the attaining of a true belief) that is because of cognitive ability. Furthermore, 
achievements are defined more generally as successes that are because of ability. Thus, 
knowledge is a cognitive achievement, the achievement of a true belief reached through ability. 
Achievements are valuable for their own sake (in a way mere lucky successes are not); therefore, 
knowledge, qua achievement, is valuable for its own sake.15 
Let us grant for the sake of argument that knowledge is a cognitive success because of cognitive 
ability, and thus, that knowledge is always and everywhere a kind of achievement (it is success 
because of ability). Even on these assumptions, the thesis that knowledge is valuable for its own 
sake, in a way that mere (unknown) true belief is not, follows only if being reached through 
 
14 This point has been conceded in various places by Duncan Pritchard (e.g., 2010; 2009a; 
2009b), who is a leading critic of robust virtue epistemology. 
15 This is a condensed version of the argument found in Greco (2010). 
ability or virtue suffices to make a true belief more valuable than its nonknown counterpart. But 
why should this be? 
At this juncture, Greco takes a nod from Aristotle. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
distinguishes between achieving an end through luck and achieving the end through the exercise 
of one’s abilities (or virtues). The latter, according to Aristotle (as Greco 2010 summarizes): 
is both intrinsically valuable and constitutive of human flourishing … In this discussion Aristotle is clearly concerned 
with intellectual virtue as well as moral virtue: his position is that the successful exercise of one’s intellectual 
virtues is both intrinsically good and constitutive of human flourishing (2010, 97-98). 
The claim that “the successful exercise of one’s intellectual virtues is intrinsically good” is put 
forward as an explanation for why knowledge, conceived of as a kind of successful exercise of 
intellectual virtue, is valuable in a way that unknown true belief is not. But to say that successful 
exercise of intellectual virtue is intrinsically valuable means just this: that exercising one’s 
intellectual virtues is good for its own sake in virtue of properties that are internal to the 
successful exercising of intellectual virtue.16  
Now, this may be where explanation comes to an end; perhaps there’s nothing helpful to say 
except that the successful exercise of virtue is valuable because of whatever of whatever intrinsic 
properties it has that make it valuable. It is not unreasonable to wish, however, for something 
more, to hope for elucidation of the relation between the successful exercise of cognitive virtue 
and epistemic value.  In the remainder of this section, we argue that a move to the subpersonal 
 
16 This way of thinking about intrinsic value owes originally to Moore (1903). For a more recent 
extended discussion, see Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (2000). 
level does shed further light on the matter; it illuminates at least part of the source of the value in 
question, in a way that an entirely personal-level virtue-theoretic proposal, on its own, does not. 
Consider one way a virtue epistemologist might add meat to the personal-level account of 
epistemic value. Intellectual virtues, as such, must be truth-oriented dispositions that are 
appropriately cognitively integrated (e.g., Pritchard 2010; Greco 2010, 156, passim) within the 
agent’s cognitive character, a point that is embraced elsewhere by Greco himself when 
distinguishing true beliefs reached through virtues from true beliefs reached through reliable but 
‘strange and fleeting processes’, the exercise of which issue beliefs that, even when true, fall 
short of knowledge.17 Cognitive successes that involve “the successful exercise of intellectual 
virtue” (i.e., that which the virtue epistemologist tells us is intrinsically valuable) are thus 
cognitive successes the formation of which is grounded in truth-oriented dispositions that are 
stable and integrated, as opposed to being merely fleeting or disintegrated. The properties of a 
truth-oriented disposition in virtue of which it is cognitively integrated within the agent’s wider 
cognitive character are thus properties in virtue of which it is valuable. What are these 
properties? 
These appear to be subpersonal properties. Here we consider two ways in which cognitive 
integration, of the sort adverted to by the virtue epistemologist, appears as a subpersonal 
phenomenon. The first involves the very nature of cognition. The second involves processes by 
which individual states or abilities become integrated into an existing cognitive system. 
 
17 See here Greco’s (2010, 156) diagnosis of Plantinga’s (1993) brain lesion case. For a related 
discussion of cognitive integration and its connection with virtue epistemology, see Pritchard 
(2010) and Menary (2012). For discussion of cognitive integration in the context of the extended 
mind debate, see Menary (2010). 
Questions about cognitive integration and cognitive systems have arisen forcefully in the recent 
debates in the philosophy of mind, particularly in connection with the Extended Mind 
Hypothesis (EMH) (Clark and Chalmers 1998) and the proposal that groups sometimes 
constitute cognitive systems (Hutchins 1995, Huebner 2013). A prominent thread in the debate 
over EMH can be summarized as follows: To the extent that Clark and Chalmers consider 
personal-level states (in the context of, e.g., their discussion of Otto and his notebook), their 
arguments for the extended view bog down (Rupert 2004, 2009, 2013). If, as they indicate, they 
wish to support the extended view of the mind by appeal to its causal-explanatory superiority – 
one that privileges natural kinds typed coarsely enough to include a significant number of real-
world instances with partly external minimal supervenience bases – there must be a successful 
science of personal-level cognition that individuates cognitive state-types very coarsely. But, 
there’s very little extant science of this sort; cognitive science tends to produce fairly fine-
grained models. 
At this juncture, one naturally turns to cognitive science in search of a boundary that 
distinguishes cognitive from noncognitive causal contributors to the production of intelligent 
behavior. One such strategy appeals to the line between causal contributors that appear within 
the relatively persisting, relatively integrated cognitive system (as a whole – that is, the system 
roughly equivalent to the individual’s entire mind or self) and those that appear beyond the 
boundary of that integrated system (Wilson 2002, Rupert 2009). This requires, however, some 
specification of a measure of integration. Rupert appeals to various conditional probabilities of 
mechanisms’ co-contribution to the production of the subject’s intelligent behavior. The view is 
not without its problems (Klein 2010, de Brigard 2017), and competing proposals have been 
made. For example, drawing on the work of Sporns and his colleagues (Sporns, Chialvo, Kaiser, 
and Hilgetag 2004), Goldstone and Gureckis appeal to a measure of computational complexity 
(Goldstone and Gureckis, 2009, 428; also see Clark 2009, 251 n24) to characterize the sort of 
integration characteristic of an integrated cognitive system. And, Edwin Hutchins proposes that a 
steep drop-off in the computational gradient (“steep gradients in the density of interaction among 
[representational] media”) marks the boundary of the cognitively relevant unit of analysis 
(Hutchins 1995, 157). For present purposes, we emphasize only that, as it has taken shape, the 
debate clearly concerns subpersonal-level properties of the cognitive system. For, the states in 
question do not appear to be of the sort to which folk psychological or rationalizing explanations 
appeal, and there’s no reason to think that subjects have conscious access to the states or 
properties in question. For example, the sort of computational complexity at issue for Sporns and 
Goldstone and Gureckis concerns such features as the density and clustering of information-
passing channels that connect different components of the cognitive architecture, such as 
whether those patterns consist in a so-called small-world architecture (dense local clustering with 
a small number of “long-range” connections) or whether the various computationally specialized 
subunits are fully connected – every one connected directly to every other. Hutchins gives no 
indication of thinking that subjects can identify by introspection the fact that the genuine 
components of their cognitive systems are the ones within the boundary set by the steep gradient 
in computational processing.18 Thus, to the extent that progress is being made on issues of 
 
18 Compare Tononi’s phi-based theory of consciousness. Although Tononi takes consciousness 
to consist in a certain sort of informational integration, he does not claim to have arrived at that 
theory by introspection. A subject might be able to report, de re, on variations in informational 
integration, simply by reporting on the extent to which a percept seems vivid or is similar to 
another; but the subject has no conscious access to the fact that what she is reporting on is 
variation in the highly complex quantitative measure phi (Tononi 2008, 220). Phi is the 
reduction- or supervenience-base of the property of something’s being conscious, not the 
introspectively available content of a personal-level conscious state. Note too that Clark’s 
interest in measures of integration reflects his interest in a story about the realizers or “local 
cognitive integration, in connection with the extended-mind debate, it is only where contributors 
“descend” to the level of subpersonal processes. 
Now consider a different sort of integration, the way in which newly acquired skills and 
memories are integrated into the subject’s cognitive profile. One especially striking stage of the 
integration process occurs during sleep. Sleep consolidates skills and memories, and it does so in 
a way that allows a new motor routine or the content of new experiences to be incorporated into 
the cognitive system’s overall functioning; this is partly a matter of maintaining balance with and 
facilitating behavior-controlling cooperation with other bodily skills and other parts of one’s 
store of memories. The latter case often goes under the heading of memory consolidation, the 
process by which memories are cemented (relatively speaking), in contrast to being lost or 
eliminated (as the records of most of our experiences are). A central and relevant aspect of 
memory consolidation is described by Dudai, Karni, and Born: “Consolidation is a dynamic, 
generative, transformative, and lingering process that is posited to balance maintenance of useful 
experience-dependent internal representations of the world with the need to adapt these 
representations to the changing world” (2015, 21). And, this consolidation process is of 
particular importance in the case of propositional knowledge: “There is also growing evidence 
that this sleep-associated redistribution of information is accompanied with an increased 
semantization of memories and the abstraction of gist information from episodic representations” 
(ibid., 23), and “the hypothetical process of systems consolidation is most commonly discussed 
within the context of declarative memory” (ibid., 26). Moreover, the reconsolidation process 
 
material supervenience base” (Clark 2007, 186) of personal-level states; that’s what’s at issue in 
his disagreement with Rupert (and others).  
appears to be directed at, and triggered by the need to, integrate declarative memory into existing 
bodies of represented facts, of the sort relevant to inference: “Hence, one may hypothesize that, 
instead of external cues, reactivated pre-existing schemas in neocortical sites direct sleep-
dependent consolidation, for example, by favoring the hippocampal reactivation of that memory 
information that fits the preexisting schema” (ibid., 25), “[P]rior knowledge schemata shape the 
engagement of the hippocampus in declarative consolidation...” (ibid., 26), and “At the same 
time, one should not overlook the postulated role of consolidation in balancing stability and 
change and maintaining adaptive predictive power of representations” (ibid. 28). 
These may be strange-sounding processes, but their basis is not fleeting; it reflects fundamental 
operations of the cognitive architecture. Furthermore, the processes in question clearly are not at 
the personal level; subjects have no conscious access to the fact that copies of recordings of 
experiences, temporarily stored in hippocampus are being re-encoded in frontal cortex; and that 
fact is not recognized by folk psychology or adverted to in rationalizing explanations of action. 
There’s no sense in which the agent herself shunts those traces from one bit of cortex to another, 
except the degenerate sense in which the agent does everything that happens at the subpersonal 
level, such as detecting zero-crossings in early visual processing (Marr 1982). And, notice that 
it’s not simply a matter of cementing memories or practiced routines; it’s simultaneously the 
maintenance of all of the subject’s existing cognitive activities and skills; for the incorporation of 
anything new into that system involves the careful adjustment of relations among existing 
structures as well as relations to new ones, so as to maintain the integrated functioning of the 
entire system, including its justification-related functioning, for example, in inference.19 
In conclusion, if we wish to understand the kind of cognitive integration appeal to which fills the 
large explanatory lacuna in the virtue-epistemologist’s proposed solution to the swamping 
problem, we do best to look—particularly at the point where Greco’s explanation bottoms out—
to the subpersonal level. Only there, it seems, do we find the structure and complexity that adds 
significant explanatory power to the virtue-epistemologists appeals to integration, such structure 
and complexity as sheds light both on what constitutes the appearance of a single integrated set 
of cognitive virtues and how such integration is dynamically maintained within a single 
cognitive system, in response to new information or pieces of evidence. On the virtue-based 
account, value flows from the exercise of intellectual virtues, which must be understood as part 
of an integrated psychology, integrated with regard to knowledge structures and to cognitive 
abilities. Such psychological integration is, however, a subpersonal matter. 
 
19 For more on memory consolidation, see Rasch and Born (2013) and Squire et al. (2015). 
Approaching the issue of integration from a slightly different angle, consider the problem of 
catastrophic interference, which afflicts many neural network models of learning and 
remembering; this problem arises when the changes in weights involved in the storage of a new 
pattern “overwrite” weights that encode previously stored patterns or associations. See Ans et al. 
(2004) and Srivastava et al. (2014) for (clearly subpersonal) attempts to solve this problem in 
what might be neurologically realistic ways. 
IV. Straightforwardly Subpersonal Processing 
In this section, we argue directly for subpersonal solutions to the swamping problem, sans any 
detour through extant, personal-level accounts of the value of knowledge. Presently, we develop 
two arguments each of which rests on a subset of the following background assumptions: 
Correspondence: In order for a belief to be true, its propositional content must correspond to reality. 
Compositionality. It is a necessary condition on a belief’s being a belief that P that the belief’s components 
represent, express, or refer to the individuals, relations, properties, etc. constitutive of P. 
Belief Endurance. In order that a subject’s belief be the same belief at two points in time, it must be an attitude 
toward the same proposition at both of those points; more generally, for any two beliefs B1 and B2 (separated in 
whatever way) to be type-identical beliefs, B1 and B2 must be attitudes toward the same proposition.20 
Subvenience. It is a nomologically necessary condition for a belief’s continuing to be held that the subject who 
holds it continue to be in some subpersonal state(s) or other that subvenes (or realizes) the belief in question. 
Ongoing State: Although the acquisition of a new belief might be an event with a terminus, having a belief is itself 
an ongoing state (Vendler 1957). 
Maintenance: Having a justified belief is not only a matter of having a belief acquired under appropriate 
circumstances; it is also a matter of sustaining that belief in an appropriate way. 
A few words are in order regarding these assumptions. Firstly, note that Correspondence, 
Compositionality, and Belief Endurance are all implied by orthodox thinking about various 
 
20 Compositionality and Belief Endurance together provide a plausible path to belief-alteration: 
the representation of a component of P might change, which changes the belief in question (it is 
no longer a belief that P). We acknowledge the possibility, however, that the content of a belief 
might change in some other, more holistic manner. The second argument below, put specifically 
in terms that presuppose a combinatorial semantics for belief states, might well be recast in a 
way not so focused on the changes in the referents of “sub-sentential” components, although we 
make no attempt to work out such an alternative formulation here. 
aspects of the possession conditions for true beliefs (at a time or over time).21 The remaining 
three assumptions require elaboration. Subvenience articulates a necessary condition for belief 
retention, namely, that the continued existence of a belief depends on the continued existence of 
an (that is, some or other) appropriate subvening base.22 
Ongoing state and Maintenance, which one of us has defended in detail in previous work, should 
not be controversial. Nonetheless, some contemporary writers on epistemic value obscure the 
point. In particular, consider again Zagzebski’s analogy with coffee production. The idea in play 
was that a good-tasting cup of coffee takes on no additional gustatory value simply in virtue of 
its being the product of a reliable coffee machine.23 From this point, we are invited to conclude – 
by parity of reasoning – that it is unclear how a true belief would become additionally 
 
21 Note, moreover, that our use of ‘proposition’ is meant to be neutral with respect to the 
metaphysics of propositions; our assumptions align with what Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) 
call ‘The Simple View’ according to which propositions are taken at least to play certain 
functional roles characteristically attributed to propositions – viz. as the primary bearer of truth 
values, the objects of agreement or disagreement, etc. 
22 The subvenience assumption, it should be clear, is stated at a level of generality such that it is 
applicable to occurrent beliefs and dispositional beliefs alike. Even if one is not occurrently 
believing a proposition P, one may nonetheless dispositionally believe P, provided one is 
disposed to affirm P and has the relevant content stored in memory (which allows for a variety of 
supervenience bases). If the memory trace is lost, so is the dispositional belief. For further 
discussion of this distinction, see Schwitzgebel (2015, §2.1). Note that dispositional beliefs are 
importantly different from dispositions to believe. The content apposite to the former must be at 
least stored in memory for the dispositional belief to persist. In contrast, a subject may have 
dispositions to believe (but not dispositional beliefs) contents she has never explicitly 
represented. For the canonical presentation of this distinction, see Audi (1994). 
23 The thought seems to be that, once one has a good-tasting cup of coffee, it remains good, or to 
the extent that it does not, the degradation of flavor likely results from, for example, chemical 
interactions with the surrounding gas molecules, independent of the production process; the 
goodness of the flavor of the two cups of coffee is, by hypothesis, a function of the appearance of 
the same chemical profile in them when the process that created them terminates, which screens 
off, from the differing processes of production, the later chemical interactions that lead to the 
degradation of flavor. 
epistemically valuable if turns out that the true belief was not only true, but also the product of a 
reliable belief-forming process. 
Consider a different analogy. The project of maintaining a pleasant home is rather unlike the 
project of making a cup of coffee. The property of being well-maintained – even though it 
contributes instrumentally to the home’s being a pleasant home – is not a property that could be 
‘swamped’ by the value of an already pleasant flat. After all, if the flat is going to continue to be 
pleasant, it will have to go on being well-maintained as the home continues to persist; and 
accordingly, the property of being well-maintained can continue to confer value to the home 
indefinitely (Carter et al. 2013, 256). What separates beliefs that are candidates for knowledge 
(i.e., ones which are justified) from mere true beliefs is precisely what separates (by analogy) 
more generally ongoing states that are positively evaluable from those that are not; the former 
are sustained through good maintenance that the latter are not. 
We propose that oftentimes (even if not always) subpersonal, justification-conferring processes – 
of the very sort that can help to explain why true beliefs arrived at via cognitively integrated 
virtues are more valuable than otherwise – underlie the continuing existence of a belief.24 In 
many cases, for example, a belief (or perhaps better, a proto-belief) does not persist absent 
certain subpersonal justificatory processes. The belief no longer exists – either by the elimination 
of its subvening states or by the alteration of its content so as to make it a different belief state – 
if it is not effectively justified in an ongoing manner. In fact, in a wide range of cases, it is highly 
 
24 Note that such justification-conferring subpersonal processes may allow for the subject to be 
epistemically responsive (e.g., to potential signs of unreliability) even if the subject never 
becomes consciously aware of any signs of unreliability. These are points that have been echoed 
in the literature on predictive processing and the Bayesian brain (e.g., Clark 2015). 
unlikely that a human subject has – for very long, anyway – a merely true belief. After all, if it is 
a true, belief-like state but does not become cemented by subpersonal processing that is also 
justification-conferring – such as memory-consolidation – it is oftentimes eliminated, either by a 
change in content or by the elimination altogether of its subpersonal basis. 
Argument 1 
A1. Premise 1. In many cases, in order that an initially formed belief-like state be maintained 
long enough for it to become a full-fledged belief state, its subpersonal realizer(s) must be 
integrated into the cognitive system. 
A1. Premise 2. In order that a belief endure over a significant period of time, its subpersonal 
realizer(s) must continue to survive integration-related subpersonal routines. 
A1. Premise 3. The kinds of integration referred to in the two preceding premises contribute to 
the belief’s justificatory status in ways that have no structural parallel at the personal level. 
A1 Premise 4. In contrast, a belief-like state that is merely true is typically not integrated into the 
cognitive system or is not maintained after formation, and thus is likely either never to become a 
full-fledged belief or to be eliminated in relatively short order. 
A1 Premise 5. On the assumption that being true provides some noninstrumental value, a 
justified true belief has – diachronically – more of it than a nonexistent belief or a belief-like 
state that is eliminated after a brief existence. 
A1 Premise 6. Given A1 Premise 3, the account of this difference in value is distinctively 
subpersonal. 
Therefore, in the cases in question, there is a straightforward—even if not traditionally 
explored—sense in which justified true beliefs are more noninstrumentally valuable than what 
would be the relevant merely true beliefs; and the account of this noninstrumental value is 
distinctively subpersonal. 
Let us clarify and elaborate on three points. Firstly, note that scope of the first premise—viz., ‘in 
many cases’. This aligns our argument with the criterion of adequacy defended at the outset. We 
are not attempting to show that, necessarily, for any subject and any P, her knowledge state that 
P has more epistemic value than would her merely true belief that P. But, neither do we intend to 
show merely that it’s possible that there be a subject such that some of her knowledge states are 
more valuable than would be the corresponding merely true belief. Rather, we mean to establish 
a substantive conclusion intermediate in strength and relevant to the human pursuit of 
knowledge: that for actual human subjects (and presumably those in nearby possible worlds), a 
great many of her knowledge states are such that they are more valuable than would be her 
merely true belief with corresponding content. 
Secondly, we should make clear what sort of belief-cementing and belief-maintaining cognitive 
processes we have in mind. Central to our conception of such processes are those described in 
the final portion of the preceding section, pertaining to memory consolidation. The role of such 
processing clearly supports A1P4, for if memory consolidation and the related justification-
related integration do not occur, the memory in question is eliminated; if it’s not cemented, it 
simply vanishes. That’s the nature of memory consolidation; what is not consolidated is lost 
(although a nuanced treatment of the point would of course deal in probabilities).  
But, to add further depth to the discussion, consider the process of checking for consistency. One 
might imagine this would occur consciously, via the conscious contemplation of the relation 
between one’s newly acquired belief (or belief-like state) and the rest of one’s beliefs. One 
concentrates on the content of the belief and the contents of one’s other beliefs and checks the set 
for consistency or other, perhaps more robust, coherence-related relations. To the extent that one 
has justification for one’s existing beliefs, consistency or coherence with them provides 
justification for a newly formed belief (or belief-like state). 
There’s good reason to think that humans do not implement anything in the vicinity of this 
personal-level ideal. According to Christopher Cherniak’s calculations, the combinatorial 
explosion entailed by any effort to check explicitly for consistency would sink any such effort 
(Cherniak 1986). The subpersonal cognitive system instead uses all manner of computing tricks, 
typically beyond the ken of the conscious mind, to try to maintain consistency, without 
depending on deliberate, conscious, serial, personal-level calculation. Some such processes occur 
during slow-wave sleep, as part of a process of reactivating and strengthening representations of 
facts. As a result of this process, the beliefs in question will not only be justified, but will also be 
in a position to justify other beliefs, a position that is explained by subpersonal processing. 
Moreover, this process puts a belief in a position to be further justified by other personal-level 
states. Your observation of a new dog in the neighborhood might undergo consolidation and 
integration in a way that creates justificatory power for your resulting belief B. But, it also 
situates B in a collection of beliefs, including other beliefs about dogs, pets, ownership, etc., such 
that those other beliefs are more likely to maintain or increase justification for B, when 
appropriate. This results partly from a declarative memory’s integration into existing knowledge-
schemas, as happens during the consolidation (and reconsolidation) process described by Dudai 
et al. (2015). In the cases in question, the only available account of the sources of this 
justificatory positioning lies at the subpersonal level. Sleep-based memory consolidation 
involves no personal-level process to which a theorist might appeal.  
We do not claim that contemporary cognitive science has yielded a complete and well-confirmed 
theory of the subconscious processes at issue; but it is highly plausible that any promising 
heuristic owes its efficacy to subpersonal processing. Consider consistency again. Imagine that a 
manageable number of randomly selected belief-realizers are activated at various times and, at 
each time, the active set is subject to a manageable process of consistency checking. How does 
one select beliefs (or their subvening structures) randomly? It boggles the mind, unless one 
allows some kind of fast, automatic search process, say, the selective activation of a subset of 
one’s beliefs by the operation of an algorithm that samples from codings of them.25 
Thirdly, we have used the language of being ‘belief-like’ to refer to states that appear in the early 
stages of belief-formation and that either are or might well become beliefs. We do not insist on 
this terminology, but we do hold that for many initially acquired or formed states of the belief-
like, information-encoding sort, for that state to become a well-functioning belief (a ‘full-fledged 
 
25 In the field of artificial intelligence, it is relatively common to exploit, in various ways, the 
strategy of sampling values and inferring from the properties of the sampled set something about 
the properties of a larger set of data or portion of the world not directly accessible to the agent. 
(See Russell and Norvig 2011, sections 14.5 and 15.5.3, which discuss approximate inference in 
Bayesian networks.) To be clear, the current point is not that the human brain is using, for 
instance, Markov chain Monte Carlo simulations to maintain epistemic hygiene, only the weaker 
point that current work in AI at least provides some clue to the sort of strategy that might be used 
by the brain to maintain epistemic hygiene, given that such hygiene is generally not maintained 
via conscious reflection on our belief and evidence sets. Note well that such processes, if they 
occur in humans, are (as memory consolidation processes are) clearly subpersonal. To the extent 
that the kind of sampling, replaying, and reactivation processes in question appear in humans, 
they are not available to consciousness and do not appear in folk psychological explanations or 
in rationalizing explanations that assign normatively governed belief-desire pairs to agents to 
account for their actions. 
belief’ one might say), it must be integrated into one’s cognitive system. Furthermore, this 
process of integration is justification conferring, because such properties as consistency and 
broad coherence are justification conferring.26 
An objector might insist that merely true beliefs possess value indistinguishable from that 
possessed by justified true beliefs. But as we’ve suggested, there are good empirical grounds to 
hold in many cases at least, such a merely true belief is likely to crumble and vanish quickly, for 
what are, from the standpoint of the personal level, inexplicable reasons. To be clear, our 
concern in this regard is not that a subject will be easily swayed by reasons (good or bad) to give 
up a merely true belief – because, as it’s sometimes claimed, a merely true belief isn’t, to use the 
Socratic metaphor, “tied down” at the personal level. Rather, very often—again, even if not 
always—the belief cannot even be the sort of stable thing that enters into reasons-sensitive 
relations until it is justified and even then, often, only insofar as it continues to be justified at the 
subpersonal level.27 
Is the value in question noninstrumental? In some sense, it clearly is. If merely true beliefs are 
unstable and prone to go out of existence before they even become full-fledged belief-states – 
compare here with Socrates’ Statues of Daedalus in the Meno28 – integrated into the subject’s 
psychology, then for any given true belief that P, whatever noninstrumental value the merely true 
 
26 See, for discussion of the value of such broad coherence, Sosa (1997). 
27 This conclusion comports well with Ernest Sosa’s (1991) account of the value of what he calls 
reflective knowledge, a value that derives from a true belief’s situatedness in a broadly coherent 
network of other true beliefs. 
28 These statues lacked a certain value, in and of themselves, given their disposition to run away 
if not tethered down. The value of the statues is realised only in the presence of appropriate 
tethering. 
belief that P has (or would have, in virtue of being true), its justified counterpart has more of it, if 
only because it lasts longer. We are not here committed to the view that there’s an 
undifferentiated value provided by truth alone, and thus that any long-held, merely true belief – 
perhaps a trivial one – might provide more value than any justified true belief held for, say, two 
weeks. We make no commitment either way about such cases. Rather, our arguments depend 
only on the claim that when the subject and the true proposition are held fixed, value accrues 
over time. We hold that, for a given subject, for a given belief that P, that subject’s merely true 
belief that P typically has less value than that subject’s knowledge state that P, if the latter 
persists longer than the former. Consider an analogy: if I were to possess Picasso’s Guernica for 
two weeks, I would consider myself lucky; to possess that very same painting for a year would 
add significantly more value to my aesthetic treasures – even though it may be that there is no 
length of time such that my owning a mediocre piece of art for that amount of time outweighs the 
value of owning Guernica for two weeks. And, to describe the underlying comparison 
dramatically, the contrast, at least in some cases, is not between S’s holding the mere true belief 
that P and S’s holding a justified true belief with the corresponding content P; it is between S’s 
having no such merely true belief at all and S’s holding its justified counterpart. Clearly the latter 
state of the subject is more noninstrumentally valuable, if there’s anything noninstrumentally 
valuable at all about having the true belief in question; any positive amount is greater than zero. 
And, less dramatically, in cases in which a merely true belief exists but only for a brief time, its 
justified, longer-lived counterpart is of greater value. By virtue of its existing as a true belief for 
a longer period, the latter accrues a greater amount of whatever sort of noninstrumental value 
truth confers. 
Another potential objection holds that the sorts of consolidation processes we have in mind do 
not confer justification on beliefs, even if such processes enhance internal consistency and 
coherence in the subject’s overall cognitive profile. After all, some such processes serve merely 
to increase the coherence and maintain the consistency of what to most of us would seem to be a 
ridiculous set of beliefs (pertaining, say, to the subject’s conviction that alien abduction has 
occurred). Presumably, though, such collections of beliefs (about alien abduction and the like) 
are thought to be ridiculous because they are false, which pushes them outside both sets of 
beliefs that we mean to be comparing – merely true beliefs and their counterpart knowledge 
states. Thus, we can fairly set this concern aside. 
We consider now a second argument: 
Argument 2 
A2. Premise 1. In many cases, subpersonal processes mediate the initial fixation of the content of 
a mental representation and also sustain the relations that keep its representational value fixed 
(by getting the mental representation into or keeping it in the content-determining relation to 
property, kind, or individual represented).29 
A2. Premise 2. Such relations often involve diagnostic relations among internal representations 
and as such are, loosely speaking, inferential; schematically, mental representation ‘a’ tracks As 
 
29 Such diagnostic or mediating relations need not be – in fact, in most cases are not – 
definitional relations or expressions of necessary and sufficient conditions. On non-defining 
sustaining mechanisms that help to fix and maintain the content of mental representations, see 
Fodor (1987, 121), Margolis (1998), and Cowie (1999). 
because (i) As reliably exhibit feature B, (ii) mental representation ‘b’ is causally sensitive to the 
presence of B, and (iii) the activation of ‘b’ tends to cause the activation of ‘a’. 
A2. Intermediate conclusion 1. Subpersonal processes partly causally determine the identity of 
proposition believed, and thus the belief itself, by determining some of the elements of the 
proposition believed (by Premises 1 and 2 and Compositionality). 
A2. Intermediate conclusion 2. In some cases, subpersonal cognitive processes maintain a belief 
(or belief-like state), keeping it in existence by grounding the tracking relations that determine 
the semantic content of components of the representational structure that picks out the 
proposition the belief in question is an attitude toward (a change in which would eliminate that 
belief – per Subvenience and Belief Endurance). 
A2. Premise 3. The internal causal relations between subpersonal states, which relations support 
the relevant tracking capacities, contribute to the belief’s (externalist) justificatory status in ways 
that have no parallel structural at the personal level. 
A2 Premise 4. In contrast, a merely true counterpart belief is likely to go out of existence; for if it 
does not enter into the justification-related relations described – for instance, subpersonal 
relations of diagnostic inference (or “inference”) – then it is not likely to retain its content. 
Therefore, for reasons parallel to those given in connection with Argument 1, a justified true 
belief is, at least in many cases, more noninstrumentally valuable than a merely true belief. 
In support of A2, Premise 1, note that many of the ways in which humans skillfully track 
individuals, property-types, and kinds in the environment rely on the detection of so-called 
microfeatures, such as subtle differences in gait, scent, or silhouette. Perhaps some such features 
can be articulated, but often – for example, in face recognition – we can’t report on how 
reidentification occurs. We simply do it. The parents of identical twins, for instance, often can 
tell the twins’ faces apart, even when others can’t, but cannot accurately report how they do it. 
In support of A2, Premise 2, we note that the relations in question diagnose the presence of the 
individuals, kinds, or properties represented by the subpersonal units on which the belief content 
supervenes and that this “diagnosing” relation is generally of epistemic value. Consider a case in 
which one recognizes the presence of one’s pet dog by slight differences in gait or scent, 
differences that one has difficulty articulating or bringing clearly to consciousness. In such a 
case, it is because of the association between subpersonal representations that one is plausibly 
justified in believing that Fido is in the house. Moreover, Bayesian models of cognitive 
processing predominate at the subpersonal level, which at least prima facie involve a justification 
or confirmation-relation in response to the environment (see Clark 2015 for more on one 
important class of Bayesian models). 
In support of A2, Premise 4, consider at least the possibility that even slight changes in detection 
routines – changes unreportable by the subject – could alter belief-content, such that some beliefs 
would go out of existence; this seems especially relevant in cases involving domains in which 
the targets of the beliefs in question are barely discriminable, such as domains of expert 
perceptual discrimination. Imagine someone who takes a botany course and who learns, but 
quickly forgets, what the experts say about the different properties of tree leaves of very similar 
looking species. How might she maintain beliefs about the properties of various species? 
Possibly, by being able to track the different leaves and having the belief that that one can be 
eaten, in a pinch, but that one should not be consumed under any circumstances. If, however, her 
ability to discriminate between microfeatural differences of the different kinds of leaves has 
suffered from degradation or interference, she no longer has the beliefs in question. If, in 
contrast, the subpersonal relations in question are maintained, so too are the relevant beliefs. 
Of course, accessibilist internalists (Chisholm 1988, BonJour 1985) will likely express doubts 
about the appeal to subpersonal processes. They are almost sure to claim that subpersonal 
processes have nothing to do with justification, that consciousness must have direct access to 
anything that counts as justification and that subjects do not have conscious access to the states, 
relations, and processes in question. 
Consider, however, the following possibility. Imagine that various subjects hold various beliefs 
that they take to be self-justifying or justified a priori (though perhaps fallibly so) – most 
importantly, justified in the absence of personal-level justifying relations. Now imagine that a 
pattern emerges: we secure evidence that a significant subset of these beliefs are false and that 
there is a principled distinction between the subpersonal processes that lead to the formation and 
maintenance of the true ones, on the one hand, and the subpersonal processes that lead to the 
formation and maintenance of the false ones, on the other hand. Focused on the personal level 
alone, the accessibility internalist can appeal to no structure or process that would explain the 
difference between the two kinds of cases; subjects report equal levels of certainty attached to 
both kinds of beliefs, and they report not having based them in any way on inferences. In this 
case, the internalist should accept that a mismatch argument establishes a role for the 
subpersonal in the theory of justification. We maintain that internalists should be similarly 
moved by mismatches of the sort we have discussed. In many cases, the processes that validate 
the justificatory status of states accessible to consciousness are subpersonal and lack any 
personal-level analogue. 
Consider a final objection. One might worry that our discussion of subpersonal phenomena – in 
particular, reasons for thinking that the sources of epistemic value reveal themselves only (or at 
least largely) subpersonally – ignores broader conceptual issues. What is it, one might wonder, 
about knowledge itself, that makes it valuable, setting aside the way it appears or is maintained 
in a particular kind of physical system. In fact, one might wonder whether all that we have said 
about the empirical cases can be ignored. To the extent that we have addressed the swamping 
problem, it is by saying something of the following sort: “justification adds value because it 
enhances stability (or personal-level integration, or increases the amount of time one holds a 
given true belief).” And, that could have been said without any detour through the empirical 
literature or the exploration of subpersonal processing. 
Here’s the rub, though. It’s not a conceptual truth that justified true beliefs are more stable or less 
likely to go out of existence or more integrated than mere true beliefs, and thus it does not suffice 
to solve the swamping problem merely to point to these (possibly) personal-level traits. Sure 
enough, if justification is correlated with some valuable characteristic F – whether it’s stability or 
cognitive integration or longer-lasting truth – then justification adds value to true beliefs. But, we 
would like to know whether, in fact, a belief’s being justified is correlated with the presence of 
F. That might hold for some creatures, depending on the way they’re built, but not for others. We 
would especially like to know whether humans are built in such a way that our justified true 
beliefs are more stable, etc. than our merely true beliefs (and perhaps thereby whether it’s 
possible for any creatures to be built in that way). We would like to know that knowledge is in 
fact often valuable for us (and more valuable than mere true belief), and one path to such a result 
is to see that the processes by which justification appears in our case are correlated with stability, 
cognitive integration, or longer-lasting truth. 
Before closing, it will be helpful to register two summary points about the conclusions we have 
reached and to situate them in the context of the initial value of knowledge debate with which we 
began. Firstly, and with reference to the taxonomy introduced in the Introduction – including 
validationism, fatalism and revisionism – we take ourselves to have explored two importantly 
distinct strands of validationism, both of which involve novel recourse to the subpersonal level, 
and which have been hitherto ignored. The first strand of validationist response showed how two 
leading attempts to defend validationist strategies—developed by Olsson and Greco—would do 
well to incorporate subpersonal theoretical components; doing so increases the chances that such 
approaches can offer viable and satisfying accounts of the value of knowledge on their own 
favored terms. If this is right, then we’ve shown an important respect in which the role of 
subpersonal processes has been overlooked and has importance in epistemic axiology. 
The second strand of validationist response, offered in Section Four, was comparatively more 
ambitious. According to this strategy of response, the pretheoretical insight that the value of 
knowledge exceeds that of mere true opinion can in principle be vindicated exclusively at the 
subpersonal level of description. To be clear, we maintain that our case for the philosophical 
import of the subpersonal in epistemic axiology does not actually require this second strand of 
validationist response; the first strand would suffice. We have, however, attempted to show how 
even this stronger strand of validationist strategy has much to recommend it. In doing so, we 
offered two connected arguments, each of which presented a novel way in which we envisage a 
subpersonal response to the swamping problem being developed. 
Finally, we admit, even emphasize, our limited understanding of the nature of the subpersonal 
processes in question. But, we take ourselves to have provided sufficient reason to be 
enthusiastic about the present approach as a way to make progress on questions about epistemic 
value, generally speaking, and the swamping problem, in particular.30 
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